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I
THE INFLUENCE OF PSYCHIATRISTS
The opinion of psychiatrists can have substantial or decisive influence in the
determination of whether an offender is fit to stand trial, whether he is responsible
for a crime, and whether he is to be executed or given a life sentence. It can play
an important part in the decision whether to place him on probation or to send him
to a correctional institution. It can, in many instances, affect the duration of the
offender's penal servitude, the choice of the particular institution to which he is sent.
his subsequent transfer to other institutions, and his activities within the institution.
It can sway the estimate of his suitability for parole or pardon.
In jurisdictions having special sex offender laws, the psychiatrist's opinion is
usually determinative of whether such an offender is to be dealt with under the
customary procedures or under the provisions of these laws. In the latter event,
he is released only on the psychiatrist's recommendation, and he can be confined
for life. Some psychiatrists have insisted that such procedures should be extended to
all offenders. They propose that the law should enable the lifelong incarceration or
supervision of any offender, on the recommendation of a psychiatrist, even if his
crime were only a minor one. As long ago as 1928, a committee of the American
Psychiatric Association, under the chairmanship of Dr. Karl A. Menninger, recom-
mended the "permanent legal detention of the incurably inadequate, incompetent,
and anti-social offenders irrespective of the particular offense committed.... ."' Not
one of the terms used in this grim scheme was defined. It was not even explained
how an "antisocial" offender differs from one who is not antisocial. Not a scintilla
of evidence was presented that psychiatrists, or anyone else, could distinguish be-
tween incurable and curable offenders. Another suggestion on this order has been
voiced more recently by a psychiatrist and a law professor in the following statement,
which should occasion alarm in any schoolboy who has fully appreciated the implica-
tions of his lessons in eighth-grade civics: ". . . [I]f analysis of the convict's person-
ality indicates that he cannot safely be released, he may have to spend the rest of
his life under legal supervision of some kind, even though the only crime he has
actually committed was a minor one."2
* B.S. 1942, M.A. 1945, Ph.D. 1950, Ohio State University. Associate Professor of Sociology and
Social Work, University of Wisconsin. Sociologist, Illinois State Prison, 1942-46. Contributor to
sociological and correctional publications.
'Menninger, Medicolegal Proposals of the American Psychiatric Association, 19 J. CraM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY 367, 376 (z928).
2 MANFRED S. GUTTmAISCER & HENRY WEISOFEN, PSCIAmTRY AND H E LAw 444-45 (1952).
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The juvenile delinquent is also much at the mercy of psychiatrists. Adjudication
as a delinquent, commitment to and release from various institutions, separation from
home and family, placement in a foster home, the granting of probation, and a host
of other decisions can depend largely on what a psychiatrist advises.
Psychiatrists have been engaged for a long time in a relentless and extensive cam-
paign to extend the scope and power of their influence in the administration of
justice, in the disposition of offenders, and in the policies and practices of correctional
institutions and agencies. This campaign has now reached reckless and irresponsible
proportions, and there has been resort to questionable tactics. Unseemly as it may
appear, the profession of psychiatry has even gone so far as to bestow prizes, honors,
and unabashed flattery upon judges who have handed down decisions that it views
as favorable to its cause. And, in the service of this campaign, psychiatrists have
produced a prodigious literature, much of which is propagandistic in nature. It is
characterized by incautious and immodest effusions, misrepresentation, extraordinary
contradictions, flagrant illogicalities, grossly-exaggerated claims, biased selection of
data, serious errors of fact and interpretation, ignorance of the distinction between
scientific questions and value judgments, lack of sophistication in research method-
ology, tautological trivialities presented in the guise of technical profundities, and
language, subject matter, and procedures not bearing the slightest resemblance to
anything medical3
Some psychiatrists have insisted that they are still greatly hampered in their
forensic work by certain traditional concepts, procedures, and laws governing the
prosecution and disposition of offenders, and they have furiously assailed these re-
straining formalities. They hold that many of the basic tenets of American juris-
prudence, which are designed to protect the rights of offenders, and many of the
limitations on administrative discretion in the handling of offenders are "stupid"
and should yield to make way for psychiatric knowledge. They argue that the law
frustrates their desire to deal with offenders in ways they deem best. Menninger puts
the general idea as follows: "The scientific attitude as shown in psychiatry must
sooner or later totally displace existing legal methods."4 And he hurls this further
challenge: ". . . [M]ust the lawyers still continue solemnly to apply mediaeval
s A number of psychiatrists have leveled all these criticisms, and others besides, against their colleagues.
Wertham, to cite only one, has reviewed some of the literature on forensic psychiatry, and he finds it
dangerous, erroneous, misleading, deceptive, highhanded, uninformed, unreliable, confused, unscientific,
tautological, biased, and grossly defective in other ways. See the following for references to some of
Wertham's reviews in which these criticisms are found: Wertham, Psychoauthoritarianism and the Law,
22 U. Cm. L. REv. 336 n. s (1955). For the most brilliant and scholarly appraisal of the literature on
forensic psychiatry and of the issues in the question of criminal responsibility, see JEROME HALL, GENERAL.
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW c. 14 (1947); Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility, 65 YALE L. J. 76x
(I956).
'KARL A. MENNINOER, THE HUMAN MIND 448-49 (3d ed. 1945). Since making this statement,
Menninger apparently has had some second thoughts. He now confesses that it is "an open professional
secret" that psychiatrists do not know how to treat offenders. He also concedes that they cannot predict
the possible dangerousness of such offenders. And he points out that psychiatrists are not even available
for such work or for even doing research on the problem. See Menninger, Book Review, 38 lowA L. Rav.
697, 701-02 (1953).
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stupidities in the name of 'established precedent,' 'public policy,' and other mouthy
archaisms?"' It is these trends, developments, ahd pressures that recently prompted
a lawyer to suggest: "... [I]f the criminal were in any position to elect between
the psychiatrist and the jurist as the future guardian of his liberties, he may be well
advised ... to re-elect the jurist."' ,
During the past several years, psychiatrists have been emboldened to increasing
arrogance because some judges and lawyers have finally shown greater disposition to
yield to their blandishments and entreaties. No less a person than Supreme Court
Justice William 0. Douglas recently gave psychiatrists warm encouragement in
their efforts to shape the administration of justice. Speaking at the graduation exer-
cises of the William Alanson White Institute of Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis, and
Psychology, he reassured them that "recent developments in the law should hearten
psychiatrists that their pleas do not always fall on deaf ears."'7 Justice Douglas
presented no evidence whatsoever that he had assayed psychiatric knowledge to
determine whether its scientific creditability merited such a friendly gesture. In fact,
practically all his psychiatric citations were drawn from the propagandistic literature
referred to above.
The most important step taken in recent years bearing on the relationship be-
tween psychiatry and the law is, of course, the decision in the Durham case, handed
down in 1954 by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia!,
This decision was written by Judge David L. Bazelon and concurred in by Judges
Henry W. Edgerton and George T. Washington. It overthrew the existing test of
criminal responsibility and adopted a new and broader test similar in type to that
for which psychiatrists have long been agitating. There can be no doubt that
the basic motivation of this decision was to "recognize" psychiatry. This is pre-
cisely what Fortas, who was the court-appointed attorney representing Durham
before the Court of Appeals and who advocated the adoption of the new test, sees as
its chief significanceO Very revealing, from the point of view of the motivations
operating in some of the champions of psychiatry, is this further observation by
Fortas, still referring to the Durham decision: "Its importance is that it is a charter,
a bill of rights, for psychiatry. .. "o An examination of the Durham decision
itself leaves no doubt that it was designed to overcome psychiatric objections to 'the
prevailing legal views on criminal responsibility.
Anyone familiar with the psychiatric journals and the literature on forensic
psychiatry does not need to have documented the wild elation with which the
Durham decision was acclaimed. Judge Bazelon himself could not have been
idolized more had he discovered the-cause and cure of'schizdphrenia, which, inci-
KAnL A. MENNINGER, THE HumAN MIND 449 (3 d ed. 1945). •
'De Grazia, The Distinction of Being Mad, 22 U. -Hi. L. RaV. 339, 352 (1955).7
VILLIA 0. DOUGLAS, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 6 (1956).
' Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir 0954).
OFortas, Implications of Durham's Case; 113 Am. J. PSYCMIATRY 577, 581 (1957).
" od. at 579.
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dentally, is conceded to be the most serious mental disease and one about which,
some psychiatrists are frank to admit, knowledge is practically nil.11 Fulsome praise
was certainly heaped upon Judge Bazelon. Forensic psychiatrists said that they were
astonished and captivated by the depth and breadth of his medical knowledge and
his comprehensive familiarity with medical and psychiatric literature. The following
statement, made by a leading forensic psychiatrist, typifies the commentaries of this
sort: "To this author, who has had very limited experience in reading legal opinions,
it is indeed encouraging to find in this opinion such a wide study of the technical
medical literature and such a thorough understanding of it.' 12
Now, an actual examination, item by item, of the citations in the Durham de-
cision will show the complete absence of any reference to "technical medical litera-
ture" and will show that practically all the psychiatric citations are to the propa-
gandistic literature whose defects have been already noted. Most of this literature
contains nothing medical and practically nothing psychiatric. It contains mainly
pleas and proposals, based in no small measure on the value judgments of psychia-
trists, for changes in the laws, in criminal trial procedures, and in correctional
policies. The Durham decision is not based on a competent and objective appraisal
of the truth of psychiatric claims and of the pretensions of psychiatry to scientific
knowledge. As a matter of fact, it is a highly-biased decision, in as much as it
completely disregards the large number of researches and extensive theoretical dis-
cussions that have yielded adverse appraisals of psychiatry. But no matter, for the
jubilation of psychiatrists was so lasting and unsubduable that more than three years
after the Durham decision, the American Psychiatric Association officially honored
Judge Bazelon. He was presented a "Certificate of Commendation" for what he had
done for psychiatry, though it was not put quite that way, of course. 3
An excellent example of how important and even momentous decisions are some-
times made on the basis of crass naivet6 is provided by the deliberations of the
American Law Institute on the question of criminal responsibility in connection with
its preparation of a Model Penal Code. One would have supposed that before
formulating its recommendations regarding the complex and crucial question of
psychiatric testimony and the procedures for handling the plea of insanity, the
American Law Institute would have tried to come to an independent assessment of
the nature, methodological soundness, theoretical coherence, logicality, predictive
efficacy, objectivity, reliability, and validity of psychiatric research, contentions, and
premises. One would have supposed that, at the very least, the Institute would have
wanted to look into the question of the reliability and validity of psychiatric judg-
ments. The course actually followed by the Institute, however, could not have devi-
ated more from this procedure. It sought the advice of three psychiatrists. Two
of these have been in the forefront of the assault on the criminal law and have been
"' Hoch, The Etiology and Epidemiology of Schizophrenia, 47 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH I071, 1074 (957):
Heath, Psychiatry, in 5 ANN. REv. MEID. 230 (1954).
12 Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness, 22 U. Cm. L. REV. 325, 330 (1955).
"" ludge Bazelon Honored, 114 Am. J..PsYcHiATY 565 (1957).
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leaders in the campaign to promote forensic psychiatry. The American Law Insti-
tute depended for its recommendations mainly on a brief memorandum prepared by
one of these advisers. 4 This memorandum is misleading, grossly exaggerates the
scientific status of psychiatric knowledge, does not present the available contradictory
or nonconfirmatory data on various points asserted in it, and fails to make reference
to even one of those psychiatrists who have denied that their profession has knowl-
edge that would be of much help in the administration of justice.'0 In addition to
this memorandum, there was a "chummy" exchange of correspondence between the
psychiatrist who prepared the memorandum and the Chief Reporter of the Institute's
Model Penal Code project, by means of which the latter sought to learn about
psychiatry and to secure clarification on various issues, particularly, one gets the
distinct impression, to determine just what it is the psychiatrists want from lawyers.'
In view of the increasing importance of psychiatry in the fields of criminology,
law, and corrections, the recent tendency of the law to embrace psychiatry to a
greater extent than ever before, the unfortunate practice of some judges and lawyers
to embark on this new course without thinking it necessary to inform themselves
about psychiatry, and the fact that the glibness of some psychiatrists is in danger of
being exceeded by the gullibility of some members of the legal profession, it becomes
particularly imperative to scrutinize psychiatric knowledge and contentions. The
present paper will review only a limited portion of these-namely, the psychiatric
view of delinquency and crime as disease, the reliability of psychiatric diagnosis, and
the two mental diseases most often discussed in connection wth delinquent and
criminal behavior.
II
DELINQUENCY AND CRIME As DISEASE
A journal bearing the redoubtable title, Postgraduate Medicine, published in one
of its volumes such formidable reports as "Atresia of the Esophagus With or With-
out Tracheo-Esophageal Fistula" and "Herniated Cervical Intervertebral Disk Sim-
ulating Angina Pectoris." Among these and other equally weighty disquisitions, in
the same volume, appeared an article with this starkly simple tide: "Medical Responsi-
bility for Juvenile Delinquency."' 7  This was by a psychiatrist. It contained the
usual rebuke of the law for not implementing psychiatric preachments about de-
linquency, along with an admonition to all who deal with this problem to accept
medical concepts regarding it. In the meantime, the medical journals have been
carrying an increasing number of articles on delinquency and crime.
"Guttmacher, Principal Diffcultes with the Present Criteria of Responsibility and Possible Alterna-
lives, MODEL PENAL CODE app. B (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
" To cite only the latest of these, Szasz says: 'I .. .want to suggest, at the very least, that the
current popular belief that psychiatry has much to contribute to jurisprudence may be ill-founded and
misleading." Szasz, Psychiatric Expert Testimony-Its Covert Meaning and Social Function, 20
Ps-C-TRY 313, 314 (1957).
" MODEL PENAL CODE app. C (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
"7Blackman, Medical Responsibility for luvenile Delinquency, o POSTGRAD. MED. 499 (1950).
CRITIQUE OF PSYCHIATRIC APPROACH 655
In the series of articles on crime that appeared in Life several months ago, there
was displayed a dramatic photograph of a criminal whose brain waves were being
examined by doctors in a clinic. The caption explained that this was done to de-
termine whether the offender needed "surgery" or "psychiatry."'8
Recently the New York Temporary State Commission on Youth and De-
linquency issued a report summarizing a large number of hearings it had held
throughout the state to get a public airing of views on all aspects of delinquency.
Hundreds of people were heard. The report concluded that the psychiatric orienta-
tion emerged as the most popular approach to the understanding, prevention, and
treatment of delinquency.' 9
In the course of a symposium on crime, Edwin J. Lukas, who is a lawyer and
former executive of a crime prevention agency, stated that if the matter were looked
at from the proper perspective, "the parallel between crime and physical illness be-
comes almost exact."
20
These are all merely incidents exemplifying the operation and impact of an
orientation vigorously promoted by psychiatrists: Delinquency and crime are med-
ical problems. Some put the proposition in so many words, simply and tersely, as
when one psychiatrist claims that "juvenile delinquency is a medical problem....
Some state it more elaborately: ". . . [T]he whole problem of criminality or crim-
inology is in the field of human behavior psychopathology, the understanding of
which requires medical and psychiatric training."2 2 Sometimes it is phrased color-
fully: "The modern surgical operating amphitheater developed out of dirty public
barber-shops. The physicians took surgery away from the barbers a century ago;
now they are taking criminology away from jailers and politicians."'23 Sometimes
it takes the form of an even more explicit battle cry: "Criminology today, like
demonology of yesterday, is a battlefield for the rightful possession of which the
psychiatrist is still fighting."
24
Certain premises underlie the view that delinquency and crime are medical
problems. These premises are, of course, that these phenomena constitute disease
and that offenders are "sick people." This notion, too, is put in a rich variety of
18 Life, Oct. 7, 1957, P. s6o. Neither the caption nor the story related the experiment in which ten
EEG records were submitted to five well-known electroencephalographers for independent interpretation.
On only four out of the ten was there agreement on the presence or absence of pathology; on only three
out of the ten was there agreement on localization of the pathology; and on only one out of the ten
was there agreement on the two factors combined. See Blum, A Note on the Reliability of Electro-
encephalographic Judgments, 4 NEUROLOGY 143 (954). No psychiatrist protested this omission, despite
the fact that the American Psychiatric Association has been much concerned with securing accurate re-
porting of news about psychiatry to the public.
" N.Y. TE IPORARY STATE COsMsss'N ON YOUTH AND DELINQUENCY, YOUTH AND DELINQUENCY 78 (1956).
" Lukas, A Criminologist Looks at Criminal Guilt, in EDMOND N. CAHN (ED.), CRIMINAL GUILT 145
(Social Meaning of Legal Concepts No. 2, 1950).
" EUGENE DAVmOFF & ELINOR S. NOErzEL, TiE CHILD GUIDANCE APPROACH TO JUVENILE DE-
LINQUENCY 150 (1951).
a Seliger, Criminal Hygiene, Fed. Prob., Jan.-March 1946, pp. 16, 19.
" KARL A. MENNINGER, THE HUMAN MIND 451 (3 d ed. 1945).
2 GREGORY ZILBOORG & GEORGE W. HENRY, A HISTORY OF MEDICAL PSYCHOLOGY 459 (1941).
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ways. One psychiatrist calls delinquents "seriously sick children.""5 Another says
that knowledge of psychopathology is the "only means of preventing crime."2'
Often delinquency is listed along with "neurosis, psychosis, and psychosomatic ill-
ness" to underscore the idea that it is just another mental illness to be encompassed
within the same frame of reference as any other 7 Another example of this practice
is provided by a committee of the House of Representatives. After a "health in-
quiry" at which psychiatrists testified, the committee issued a report wherein
mental illness subsumes delinquency.28 Sometimes, the point is set forth calmly, as
in Glueck's sedate but unconvincing argument that some of the knotty legal issues in
criminal responsibility would be eased if crime were viewed as a sickness and not
as a moral transgression. More often, it is proclaimed ardently, as in the following
statement by Karpman, promulging the policy of a journal established and edited
by him: "The Archives will fight vigorously for the recognition of criminal
psychiatry. It will fight for the recognition of the criminal as a very sick person,
much sicker than either psychosis [sic] or neurosis [sic] .... ,,30
But greatest effectiveness in drumming the ideology that delinquency and crime
are disease and offenders are sick is probably not achieved when it is explicitly
propounded, whether vociferously or quietly. More persuasive is its exposition un-
accompanied by any theoretical elaboration in defense of it, as though there could
be no question in the world about the truth of the matter. And resort to the
ubiquitous medical analogy clinches this subtle form of presentation. To illustrate,
one psychiatrist says:
sl
Using medical terms delinquency can be described as a very widespread illness, affecting
mainly young people and causing gross symptoms [in certain proportions of this popula-
tion].... [M]ild cases usually are treated at home.... The illness, on the whole, is
benign. Unfortunately [after recovery, in certain proportions of cases] it is followed by
relapses. The illness then takes a prolonged course but even then in most cases heals
off.
Another says that "theft, like rheumatic fever, is a disease of childhood and
adolescence, and, as in rheumatic fever, attacks in later life are frequently in the
nature of recurrences."'  A third puts it as follows: "When a patient goes to the
hospital with a physical illness, he receives medication and therapy directed spe-
2
rEveoleen N. Rexford, in DOUGLAS A. THOM CLINIC FOR CHILDREN, INC., ANN. RrEP. 17 (1956).
2" Ruth S. Eissler, Scapegoats of Society, ji K. R. EissLER (ED.), SEA.crmxoirrs oN DELINQUENCY 304
(1949).
" GEORGE J. MOR & MARIAN A. DESPREs, Tim SroRmyn DECADE: ADOLESCENCE 210 (1958),
21 House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Health Inquiry, H.R. Rm,. No. 1338, 83d0
Cong., 2d Ses4. 123 (1954).
29 Glueck, Changing Concepts in Forensic Psychiatry, 45 J. Cnms. L., C. & P.S. 123, 127 (x954).
:o Karpman, Criminal Psychodynamics: 4 Platform, ARCH. CRIM. PSYCHODYN. 3, 96 (1955).
' Balint, On Punishing Offenders, in GEORGE B. VILBUR & WARNER MUENSTERIJEROER (EDS.)r
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND CULTURE 254, 266 (195).
" Bowlby, Forty-Four Juvenile Thieves: Their Characters and Home-Life, 25 INT'L J. PSYCHO-ANAL.
19 (1944).
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cifically to his ailment . .. We send our children to correctional institutions to
be treated for an illness... ."3
So powerful is the conviction of some psychiatrists that crime stems from mental
disease that they have held the commission of crime in itself constitutes conclusive
evidence of the presence of mental disease. Again, this aspect of the ideology usually
draws on the medical analogy. The thesis runs as follows: Just as fever is a
symptom of physical disease, so crime is a symptom of mental disease. The following
excerpt provides an example of just such a formulation: ". . . [J]ust as symptoms of
physical illness are danger signals that call for remedial measures, a criminal act,
in a high percentage of cases, is a signal of psychological distress and a natural
appeal for remedy."34  A like conclusion has been reached by many psychiatrists,
another one of whom writes: "It is becoming increasingly apparent that chronic in-
corrigible criminal behavior is symptomatic of mental disease.... ."" About thirty
years ago, Menninger hopefully prophesied that "the time will come when stealing
or murder will be thought of as a symptom, indicating the presence of a disease,
a personality disease, if you will... .,36 Twenty-five years later, another psychiatrist
expressed the identical sentiment: "One may hope that a day will come when the
very fact of having committed a crime will be regarded as evidence of a mental
disease .... ,"7 As early as 193o, the American Medical Association, acting on the
recommendations of representatives of medicine, psychiatry, and law, officially went
on record in support of the view that a diagnosis of mental disease is permissible
"even when the criminal has shown no evidence of mental disease other than his
criminal behavior."3'
In the meantime, some psychiatrists have shown disdain for the legal presump-
tion of sanity, which one dismisses, redundantly, as that "hoary old legal dogma."3 9
It has been proposed by more than one psychiatrist that the law should presume not
sanity, but insanity. One of these has commented that the legal doctrine of the
"reasonable man" does not square with the findings of modern psychiatry. He
intimates that the law should replace the presumption of sanity with the presumption
of insanity, so confident is he that the offender is more' likely to be insane than
sane.40
However it is put, the irrepressible and irresponsible campaign-for that is what
it is-to implant the view that crime and delinquency are disease and offenders are
sick people has had great impact. The public, as well as important officials, is more
and more coming to actually believe the physicians who tell it that the criminal is a
"Tarrasch, Delinquency Is Normal Behavior, 29 Focus 97, 1o (195o).
"RALPH S. BANAY, WE CALL THEM CRIMINALS 6 (1957).
"Louis LINN, A HANDBooK op HospirAL PSYCHIATRY 331 (955).
"Menninger, Medicolegal Proposals of the American Psychiatric Association, 19 J. CiuM. L. & CRiM-
INOLOGY 367, 373 (1928).
" BENYAMIN KARPMAN, THE SEXUAL OFFENDER AND His OFFENSES 218 (3954).
"Psychiatry in Relation to Crime, 95 A.M.A.J. 346 (1930).
'o Overholser, The Place of Psychiatry in the Criminal Law, 16 B.U.L. REV. 322, 329 (1936).
°Poindexter, Mental Illness in a State Penitentiary, 45 J. Cim. L., C. & P.S. 599, 562 (95_%).
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sick person in need of medical treatment. Fortas, who has already been cited, thinks
that the Durham decision and other decisions which show a greater acceptance of
psychiatric doctrines by the courts indicate that the judges involved "suspect that
mental disorders may figure in criminal activities with vastly more frequency than
is currently recognized by our legal procedures .. ."41 If Fortas is correct, then
these judges are showing remarkable resoluteness, even if their conclusion is
nothing but a surmise. All the more so because they have presented no scientific
evidence to substantiate even a "suspicion," and particularly so in view of the fact
that, though these judges may have at least tentatively made up their minds on the
matter, psychiatrists are in a state of complete disaccord about it.
For, though it is true that the psychiatric propagandists have gained widespread
support for their ideology and have succeeded in getting judges, lawyers, correc-
tional administrators, and others to implement it, the psychiatric profession does not
present a united front on this issue. As is true in regard to practically every
fundamental postulate in psychiatry, so in regard to this problem, there is vast
disagreement, confusion, and contradiction. This can be documented by a few
citations, remembering that these constitute an insignificant proportion of those
that could be assembled.
One psychiatrist thinks that all offenders show traits differentiating them from
nonoffenders, 42 but another says that the great majority do not vary much from
the average person.4  Another psychiatrist advises that "no one would maintain
that all criminals are mentally ill or abnormal, '44 thereby showing unfamiliarity
with the writings of Karpman and scores of others who maintain exactly that. 5
Menninger gives the assurance that psychiatrists "do not consider that many
offenders in our prisons are mentally sick . . . " thus overlooking a large number
of psychiatrists who have contended just the opposite.47 Schilder maintains that "the
majority of criminals are normal ...,"; however, Abrahamsen counters that "the
'normal' offender is a myth. . .. ,49 East has concluded that the "mentally abnormal
criminal is the exception and not the rule . . . ,""o a view challenged by another
psychiatrist who claims that "one does not expect anti-social conduct from normally
constituted individuals. ...,"' Neustatter decries what he calls the "fallacy" of
S1 Fortas, supra note 9, at 577-78.
'42 Henderson, Psychopathic Constitution and Criminal Behaviour, in L. RADzINowlcz & J. W. C.
TURNER (Ens.), MENTAL ABNORMALITY AND CRIME xo6 (English Studies in Criminal Science No. 2,
1944).
"Schmideberg, The Analytic Treatment of Major Criminals: Therapeutic Results and Technical
Problems, in EISSLER, op. cit. supra note 26, at 174.
"
4 DAVID STAFFORD-CLARK, PSYCHIATRY To-DAY 221 (1952).
" BENJAMIN KARPMAN, THE SEXUAL OFFENDER AND His O:FFENCES 562 (1954).
46VVIs.LIAis C. MENNINGER, PSYCHIATRY: ITS EVOLUTroN AND PRESENT STATUS 123 (1948).
"'Haugen, Coen, & Dickel, Possibilities of Psychotherapy in Prisoners, 31 Focus 83 (1952).
"PAL SCHILDER (ARR. By LAUREITA BENDER), PSYCHOANALYSIS, MAN, AND SOCIETY 238 (1951).
" DAVID ABRAHAMsEN, WHO ARE THE GUILTY? 125 (1952).
5 5 NoRwooD EAST, SOCIETY AND THE CRIMINAL 228 (195i).
"Peskin, The Modern Approach to Legal Responsibility, the Psychopath and the M'Naghten Rules,
I FORENSIC MED. 189, 191 (954).
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regarding all criminality as psychological illness, 2 but many psychiatrists share the
opinion that "every criminal has a defective personality .... -"3 Regarding juvenile
delinquents, one psychiatrist is satisfied that "the largest percentage" of serious de-
linquents is normal,"' but this is offset by another who is satisfied that all juveniles
who are in repeated trouble are "mentally ill."55  English and Pearson, the well-
known child psychiatrists, write that the psychiatrist "does not believe that all de-
linquents are sick people .... ,"" but they fail to cite Bender, a well-known child
psychiatrist, who insists that she does not understand what is meant by "normal de-
linquency" '57 Regarding murder, Glueck finds that no murderer is normal when
he commits his crime,58 only to be contradicted by another practitioner who finds
that there are normal murderers 9
One would have supposed that this muddle in itself would have been sufficient
to make of psychiatry a profession so utterly humble as practically never to be
heard from. At the very least, one would have supposed that psychiatrists would
have been too chagrined to prescribe a course of action for society to follow in
tackling its crime problem. Quite to the contrary, however, psychiatrists and those
convinced by them have moved apace to put their views into effect on many
fronts. Changes in the laws and certain court decisions have already been men-
tioned. All over the country, medically-oriented clinics, diagnostic centers, and
residential treatment facilities are being established for delinquents and "emotionally
disturbed children.""0 An administrator of the New York Department of Mental
Hygiene has reported that large numbers of delinquent children are now being cer-
tified directly to institutions for the mentally ill in his state. He said that "the line
between criminality and mental illness or mental defect is being redrawn."81 The
top administrator of the same department has commented that the psychiatrists have
been "singularly successful with the courts," and, increasingly, offenders are being
sent to "civil state hospitals instead of hospitals for the criminally insane"'62
A well-known psychiatrist has revealed that in New York City, Puerto Rican
1
'Neustatter, Psychiatry and Crime, 170 PRACTITIONER 391 (1953).
" Banay, Crime and Aftermath: Results of a Research on the Individual Offender, in NAT'L PROBIA-
TION AND PAROLE Ass'N, 1948 YEARBOOK 35 (i949).
" Curran, Specialized Techniques in the Treatment of juvenile Delinquency, X57 A.M.A.J. 1o8
(1955).
"Juvenile Delinquency (Boston, Mass.), Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile
Delinquency of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 293 (1954).
" 0. SPURGEON ENGLISH & GERALD H. J. PEARSON, EMOTIONAL PROBLEMS OF LIVING 290 (rev.
ed. 1955).
"' Bender, cited by Karpman, Psychodynamics of Child Delinquency: Further Contributions, z5 Am.
J. ORTHOPSvcHtITRY 238, 274 (955).
" Glucck, supra note 29, at 130-31,
"' ROYAL COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, MINUrES oF EVIDENCE 359 (1949).
"o The term "emotionally disturbed" is never operationally defined in the proposals to establish insti-
tutions to house children who are said to belong in that category.
" Hunt, Mental Hygiene and Correction: An Operational Blueprint, in PROC.EEDINGS OF THE FREDERICK
A. MORAN MEMORIAL INSTITUTE ON DELINQUENCY AND CRIME 21 (1953).
"a Hoch, The Changing Role of State Mental Hospitals, in 1956 ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE MEL-
BANK MEMORIAL FUND, PROGRAMS FOR COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH 149 (1957).
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adolescents who become "emotionally disturbed" because of their difficult circum-
stances have been incorrectly diagnosed as mentally ill and have been wrongly com-
mitted to mental hospitals. He has insisted that, despite the fact that "judicial notice
has been taken of such falsely committed cases," there has been no improvement in
the situation. 3 Recently, a child guidance clinic made a special study of 5o0 cases
referred to it. In only twenty-one per cent of these were the referrals regarded as
unequivocally justified.64 An examination of the reported behavior and problems
on account of which these children were referred for diagnosis of their mental
condition will show that the overwhelming majority were trivialities, universally
found in children, and designated "normal" by many psychiatrists, even when mani-
fested in marked degree.
Recently, a psychiatrist issued a very strong warning and protest that there has
been an enormous increase in the diagnosis of schizophrenia among children. She
pointed out that schizophrenia "is not a disease of childhood." 5 She gave illustra-
tions of delinquents engaged in the customary types of gang activities who were
wrongly given diagnoses of the more malignant mental diseases. She commented:
"A child who commits a crime is now likely to be diagnosed schizophrenic and sent
to a mental hospital."6 She further pointed out that normal children were being
committed to mental hospitals. Finally, she reported on a clinical re-evaluation
of sixty children "in trouble for many different reasons" who were diagnosed as
schizophrenic. It was found that the diagnosis was wrong in practically all cases. 7
How can psychiatrists tell whether or not a delinquent or a criminal is mentally
sick? Psychiatrists, like all other medical practitioners, presumably find this out by
a process universally used in medicine-diagnosis. It would be sheer folly to dis-
regard the clamorous insistence of psychiatrists that delinquency and crime are dis-
ease and that the offender is mentally sick, if for no reason other than the high
authority from which it emanates. On the other hand, surely anyone would agree
that it would be equal folly-it would be irresponsible-to encourage it, to advance it,
to support it, to act on it, to incorporate it in court decisions and laws without a care-
ful examination of the evidence. Therefore, the first step should be an appraisal of
the scientific status of the process of diagnosis by which psychiatrists determine the
mental condition of offenders.
III
Tm RELIABILITY OF PsYcHIATIc DIAGNOSIS
Generally, the specific technical diagnosis of an offender's mental condition is not
in issue, as such, and does not concern the court or the correctional administrator.
The court is interested in the consequences and implications of the defendant's
08 FREDRIC WERTHm, THE CIRCLE OF GUILT 134 (1956).
SFoRnEsr N. ANDERsoN & HELEN C. DEAN, SofE ASPECTS OF CHILD GUIDANCE CLINIC INTAKE
PoLIY AND PRACaCs 9 (956).
" Mosse, The Misuse of the Diagnosis Childhood Schizophrenia, 114 AM. J. PSyCHIATRY 791 (x958).
Ibid.
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mental condition, in so far as the law gives special effect to these in the judgment
and disposition to be made, regardless of the specific diagnostic category. And the
correctional administrator is concerned with decisions that can be altered in accord-
ance with the psychiatric counsel he gets regarding the attributes and results thought
to be associated with the various types of mental disorders afflicting his charges.
The psychiatrist himself, however, presumably thinks, as do all physicians, in
terms of the specific diagnosis. Diagnosis is the process whereby the psychiatrist
determines which one or more of the large variety of mental diseases and disorders
a subject has. On the basis of the diagnosis, the psychiatrist comes to conclusions
regarding the course, symptomatology, prognosis, malignancy, treatment, and other
aspects of the subject's ailment that can help determine judicial and correctional
decisions. All the decisions that can be affected by psychiatric judgment will ulti-
mately rest on diagnosis, which is the basic instrumentality of medical practice.
A striking example of the importance of diagnosis and of how a specific diagnostic
category can have crucial bearing on the disposition of offenders is provided by a
recent occurrence. It has been reported that in a certain jurisdiction, the staff of a
mental hospital that has been customarily testifying that psychopathic or sociopathic
personality is not a mental disease formally announced that henceforth it would
testify that this condition does constitute a mental disease. 8 Other psychiatrists, in
and outside of hospitals, in this and in other jurisdictions, do not share the view
and would not testify that the condition in question is a mental disease. Thus, the
fate-execution, or acquittal on the grounds of insanity-of a murderer, say, can
depend in the final analysis on a specific diagnosis and on the value judgment of
psychiatrists regarding that diagnosis.
Take, as another example, the question of the malignancy of the various mental
diseases. The malignancy ascribed to an offender's mental disease can certainly have
a bearing on decisions made about him. It can, in the case of a sex offender, for
instance, figure in the determination as to when to release him, if ever. Again, it
depends upon the philosophy of psychiatrists whether a mental disease is benign or
malignant, and this philosophy differs markedly among different psychiatrists. Take
the psychoneuroses, for example. One practitioner describes them as a "relatively
benign group of personality disturbances . . . ,"" while another reports that "some
authorities regard the psychoneuroses as the most serious disease threat of modern
civilization."7
If so much can depend on psychiatric diagnosis, the question can be raised: How
reliable is it?71 Surely the courts, the correctional administrators, and the welfare
S n re Rosenfeld, 157 F. Supp. 18 (D.D.C. '957).
ArmruR P. NoyEs, MODERN CLINICA1. PSyCHIATRY 445 (4th ed. 1953).
o EDwARD A. STREcKER, FUNDAMENTALS OF PsYcmATRY 38 (5th ed. x952).
7 1 Many persons do not understand the meaning of the concept of reliability in scientific methodology.
Reliability means agreement by the experts on their theories, observations, and conclusions-agreement not
by fiat, but by scientific demonstration of the correctness of any particular proposition. To the extent that
a discipline is scientifically established, a question regarding any particular aspect of its subject matter
will yield essentially the same answer from all experts. If the same question brings forth widely
divergent responses, then it should be clear that the point involved has not been scientifically established.
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officials must be assuming that psychiatric diagnoses have adequate reliability. It
is inconceivable that they would embrace psychiatry unless they were convinced that
the judgments, diagnoses, and conclusions of its practitioners are reliable.
The literature of. the forensic psychiatrists often sets forth implicit and explicit
persuasions that psychiatric diagnoses are as reliable as those of any other branch of
medicine. Zilboorg, for example, writes: "The clinical judgment of the psychiatrist-
provided he be properly qualified-must be accepted by the courts to the same extent
as the clinical judgment of a surgeon or an internist."72 More than one psychiatrist
has expressed resentment at the proclivity of some observers to raise questions about
psychiatric diagnoses and judgments. One of these has called for what looks like
unquestioning acceptance of these judgments :71
If society sees fit to appoint neutral experts to determine the sanity of the defendant,
then society should demonstrate its faith in these experts and abide fully by their findings.
This [apparently referring to noncompliance with psychiatric findings] is tantamount to
calling in a physician for a serious medical illness and then not following his advice.
Assurance has been given that "psychiatry has its nosology just as do the other
branches of medicine. Psychiatric clinical entities are as discrete as the cardiac or the
pulmonary disorders." 4 Statements like the following are often encountered:
"Modern psychiatric diagnoses ...in acute and chronic mental disorders, are as
accurate as those in tuberculosis, communicable disease, or other illness. '75
Time and again, in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, psychia-
trists have dismissed as baseless the charge that they are frequently in disagreement
about their diagnoses, observations, and theories. They insist that they are in agree-
ment on most issues. Overholser makes a daring misrepresentation on this point,
typical of many others that could be cited :76
There is general agreement among psychiatrists upon the essential facts and the
significance of words and actions, although there are minor differences in theory. The
differences and disagreements are much exaggerated by the critics, and constitute one of
the allleged reasons for the reluctance of the legal profession to accept any more readily
than they do psychiatric concepts and teachings.
If one turns from these writings of the forensic psychiatrists to the writings of
leading psychiatrists who have no special interest in forensic work; who address
themselves to the problem of diagnosis as a scientific issue to be solved by research;
who do not spend an inordinate amount of time haranguing and harassing the legal
"
2 Zilboorg, .4 Step Toward Enlightened Justice, 22 U. GI. L. Rv. 33, 335 (1955).
78 Mental Disorder and Criminal Responsibility: 4 Symposium, 3 J. Soc. THERAPY 66, 87-88 (957).
In referring to "neutral experts," this psychiatrist apparently has in mind those jurisdictions and
situations in which the expert does not appear as a partisan for the defense or for the prosecution.
7' GUTTMACHER & WEHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 27. Guttmacher has elsewhere taken a differcnt
position: "Psychiatric nosology is, at best, an unsatisfactory business. ... See MANFRED S. GurrMAciun,
SEX OFFENSES 102 (195r).
" A. E. BENNETT, EUGENE HARGROXVE, & BERNICE ENGLE, THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY IN GENERAL
HosPITALS 91 (1956).
0 WINFRED OVERHOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW 23 (1953).
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profession; who are not busily engaged in fighting for changes in the laws which
would bring them into greater conformity with their own value position; who do not
seize upon every writing and speaking engagement as an opportunity to seduce
judges and others about the present status of psychiatric knowledge; who do not
pout that the court psychiatrist has as much right as the prosecutor and defense
counsel to be heard as to the disposition of defendants; 77 and who, in other ways, are
not clamoring to enhance their power to control and decide the destiny of offenders,
one gets an entirely different picture of the. state of psychiatric diagnosis. As a matter
of fact, one arrives at the unmistakable conclusion that psychiatric diagnosis is
grossly unreliable, is beset by numerous unsolved complexities, and is, in -fact, in a
state of chaos.
Take, for example, the report of the i951 annual meeting of the American
Psychopathological Associations This meeting was devoted to the topic of psychia-
tric diagnosis and was only incidentally concerned with forensic matters. By culling
certain statements from the report of this meeting, it is possible to show that some
psychiatrists' appraisals of the reliability of diagnosis and of the competence of
psychiatric research is in striking contrast to the samples of exaggerated claims set
forth above. Disregarding the specific authorship of the statements, it was submitted
at this meeting that the concept of psychosis is not "definable" 79 and is so fallacious
as to have "facilitated loose and unscientific thinking" in psychiatry; s that the term
schizophrenia means many different things to different people;"1 that "it is hardly
necessary to stress the extent to which there is confusion in regard to the diagnosis
at the present time";" that because there is no agreement on psychodynamics among
the different schools of thought at present, "we encounter a complete confusion" in
diagnosis ;83 that "the personality and biases of the psychiatrist may also influence
his choice of a diagnostic label";14 that because there is "looseness and ambiguity" in
the terms used by psychiatrists, progress in diagnosis and treatment is retarded; 5
that "the psychiatric literature is replete with dissensions and controversies" even on
"elementary problems"; s5 that diagnosis in child psychiatry "has literally been a
'Tower of Babel' ,,;87 that in the military situation, psychiatrists may deliberately
make invalid diagnoses in order to comply with administrative exigencies rather
than medical dictates;88 that the extent of agreement among psychiatrists on specific
diagnoses was found through research to be "neither satisfactory nor desirable"; 9
that an examination of researches reported in the issues of eleven psychiatric and
related journals over a two-year period showed grave defects and serious lack of
7' Guttmacher, Adult Court Psychiatric Clinics, in UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO CONFERENCE ON CRIME,
CRIMES o VIOLENCE 51 (1950)-78 PATL H. HocH & JOSEPH ZUBIN (EDs.), CURRENT PROBLEMS IN PSYCMATc DIAGNOSIS (1953).
191d. at 25. 'oId. at 31.
Id. at i8o. "Id. at 41.
"Id. at 50. "Id. at io8-o9.
Id. at 267. 'Id. at 23!.
"id. at 22o. I Id. at 55.
I ld. at 6o.
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sophistication in experimental methodology; ° that psychiatric research is ham-
pered by "an almost total lack of training in terms of scientific disciplines."'"
It must not be supposed that such strictures are confined to this one report. Far
from it; for, although one could never get a true picture of the situation by reading
only the highly deceptive literature of the forensic psychiatrists, the unreliability of
psychiatric diagnosis is a widely-documented fact. Ironically enough, on the very eve
of the Durham decision, no less a source than the American Journal of Psychiatry
editorially took to task those psychiatrists who were attacking the existing rules and
laws of criminal responsibility and urging their abrogation. The editorial took the
position that these psychiatrists had not presented convincing evidence that psychia-
try had made the advances claimed by them and on the basis of which they were
demanding changes in the lawsY2 The editorial further reminded these doughty
fighters that medical experts do not agree even "as to the diagnosis of textbook types
of insanity.""3
Even more recently, a psychiatrist cautioned: "Diagnostic judgments are cur-
rently so invalid and unreliable that little weight should be attached to them."94 And
more recently still, Mosse, who has already been cited as expressing alarm at the
increasing tendency for psychiatrists readily and wrongly to diagnose delinquents as
schizophrenic, stated: "No valid classification of mental diseases in children has yet
been- worked out.. . ."" Further, she explained: "One of the most important gaps
in our knowledge is that the limits of normal for children of different ages have not
yet been established,"90 a view shared by other cautious clinicians. It might be
interesting to select the final example from a context as far removed as possible from
any immediate forensic concern. A psychiatrist who has done research on the
relationship between-peptic ulcer and mental disorder has observed that one of the
difficulties in such research is the "unreliability of psychiatric diagnosis." He also
commented that even the same clinicians are inconsistent with themselves. 7
Psychiatrists have sought to convince lawyers, correctional administrators, and
others not only that their diagnoses are as reliable as those of other branches of
medicine, but also that they, like other medical practitioners, have reliable and valid
tools, devices, tests, and procedures to augment and confirm their clinical diagnoses
and impressions. For example, one psychiatrist has said: "Just as the medical person
uses x-ray and laboratory tests in making a physical diagnosis, so are there similar
routines to determine the personality structure."9" A leading forensic psychiatrist
has maintained that psychiatrists have "certain physical and psychological tests and
90 Id. at 20. "Id. at 20.
13 Criminal Irresponsibility, 11o Am. J. PSYCIATRY 627, 628 (x954).
:I Ibid. -,
"Thorne, Psychiatric Responsibilities in the Adminstration of Criminal Justice, 2 ARcH. CRnu.
PSYCHODYN. 226, 236 (i957).
"Mosse, supra note 65, at 791.
"Id. at 793.
"Gosling, Peptic Ulcer and Mental Disorder-ll, 2 J. PSYcHom. REs. 285 (1958).
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well recognized constellations of symptoms, to help guide us in our judgments. '9
As in regard to the contention about reliability, so in regard to this contention,
these writers rarely spoil their positive declarations by referring to quite a different
kind of observation that has been made by psychiatrists and other experts about their
diagnostic instruments. A psychiatrist in the College of Physicians and Surgeons
of Columbia University, for example, has considered the matter of diagnosis and
diagnostic tools. He comes to a conclusion that is diametrically opposed to the ones
cited. He holds that in contrast to the physical diseases, the existence of which can
be determined on the basis of "a recognizable syndrome" and by the use of certain
devices and tests, "in emotional and mental illnesses this is almost never the case;
even in the so-called major mental and emotional illnesses, such guides to detection
and diagnosis are almost entirely lacking."1 °  To cite another example, the New
York State Commissioner of Mental Hygiene recently said:101
While other fields of medicine often can augment or even verify clinical diagnoses by
other methods-by tests that are independent of the clinical appraisal of the patient-
this is generally not true in psychiatry. Although I am fully aware of the claims that it
can be done, I maintain that it cannot.
Most of the time, there is particular praise for the Rorschach test. One gets the
impression that it is regarded by psychiatrists as the most powerful tool at their
disposal and one which goes a long way in putting psychiatry on a par with any
other medical specialty. Strecker, for example, appearing for the defense in a
murder trial in which the life of the defendant was at stake, testified :102
I regard the Rorschach test as very scientific, well-tried, in common use in all good
mental hospitals, relied on by the majority of psychiatrists I know, and in my opinion the
interpretation has been in agreement with my own opinion and diagnosis in more than
95% of the cases.
Wertham has stated, "The Rorschach Test is a valid scientific method.' 0 13 Banay
has extolled the Rorschach test.' 0 4  Guttmacher has claimed that the Rorschach
test can be "amazingly revealing."'"" Elsewhere, he and a lawyer, writing jointly,
say that "definite diagnostic criteria have been established" for it. They are
astounded by "how much a skillful Rorschach technician can tell about a patient that
he has never seen, merely from analyzing his test responses.'
10 6
"9 Guttmacher, Criminal Responsibility in Certain Homicide Cases Involting Family Members, in
PAUL H. HOCH & JOSEPH ZUntI (EDs.), PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 74 (1955).
.0 Ginsburg, The Neuroses, 286 ANNALS 55 (1953).
"'-Hoch, The Etiology and Epidemiology of Schizophrenia, 47 Am. J. PuB. HEALTH 1071 (1957).
... RICHARD GEMfAN, A MURDER 1N PARADISE 137 (rev. ed. 1956). Dr. Strecker did not reveal
whether his own diagnoses were checked for reliability in any way other than by their agreement with
the Rorschach test. If diagnoses yielded by the Rorschach test are unreliable and Dr. Strecker's diagnoses
are in agreement with them, then Dr. Strecker's diagnoses have to be unreliable. As will be noted
shortly, the Rorschach test has been found by some experts to be grossly unreliable.
"o' FREDRIC WERTHAM, SEDUCTION OF THE INNOCENT 56 (1954).
... Banay, Applications of Clinical Psychology to Crime and Delinquency, in I DANIEL BROWER &
LAWRENCE E. ABT (EDs.), PROGRESS IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 459, 463 (1952).
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All these misleading effusions fail even to refer to another side of the story. The
other side of the story is provided by the experimental researches, theoretical analyses,
and methodological observations that have demonstrated the unreliability, invalidity,
subjectivity, theoretical weaknesses, illogicalities, and questionable premises of the
Rorschach test. It is these considerations that led a psychologist, who is an expert
on the construction and validation of personality tests, to conclude that the results
secured through the Rorschach test are not superior to the results that would be
secured by writing the different diagnoses on the faces of a die and then casting the
die to determine the personality of a subject.107 It is a review of some of these
researches and judgments, which need not be repeated here, that also led the present
writer to conclude elewhere: ". . . [T]he results of the Rorschach test should not be
used as a basis for reaching decisions about people and they should not be allowed
to enter in any serious way into deliberations looking toward the disposition of
cases."' 8 Testimony regarding a defendant's personality and mental condition which
is based in whole or in part on the Rorschach test should certainly not be allowed in
court.
The gross unreliability of psychiatric diagnosis-which, in the courts, takes the
form of the so-called battle of the experts-has been one of the most painfully em-
barrassing ordeals for forensic psychiatrists. Indeed, it is one of the leading concerns
of the psychiatric profession as a whole that it is in connection with forensic work
that the unreliability of diagnosis comes in for the greatest amount of public scrutiny,
keeps psychiatry in disrepute with those who have sufficient scientific sophistication to
understand its implications, and provides merriment for people. Psychiatrists have
tried by every possible means to escape this morass. They have denied the importance
of diagnosis. They have even disparaged diagnosis. They have said that a diagnosis
is a triviality that cannot encompass the actual object of psychiatric study-"the whole
man." But the study of the whole man is philosophy, not medicine. In any event,
psychiatrists of this persuasion have been confronted by powerful and even angry
reminders from colleagues that if they claim to be physicians, then they must
diagnose. They are told that proper treatment depends on it, prognosis depends
on it, scientific progress depends on it. The American Journal of Psychiatry has
issued the following editorial warning on the matter: ". . . [I]n psychiatry, as well as
in all medical disciplines, accurate diagnosis is the keystone of appropriate treat-
ment and competent prognosis."'0 9 A textbook has taken this firm stand: "The con-
temptuous attitude toward diagnosis, which is so prominent a feature of many con-
temporary schools [of psychiatry], runs counter to the entire spirit of medicine."n
One psychiatrist put it very bluntly:"'
"'
7H. J. EYSENCK, SENSE AND NONSENSE IN PSYCHOLOGY 221 (1957).
' Hakeem, .A Critique of the Psychiatric Approach to the Prevention of Jteenile Delinquency, $
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With really unpardonable ignorance, it. is stated by some psychiatrists that the diagnosis
of a psychiatric entity is unimportant and that the so-called psychodynamics are the
essential object of study. This would be partially excusable, only if they could give the
dynamics in more than hypothetical formulation. Such statements display a lamentable
lack of insight into the essentials of scientific procedure and do not speak happily for the
future of research in the field.
Some psychiatrists have taken refuge from diagnosis by giving a description of
personality instead. But Ackerman, as do others, objects to this and points out
that what goes into such a description is "too largely determined by subjective
emphases in a particular examiner's *mind.""'  This, of course, is only another way
of saying that descriptions of personality can be as unreliable as diagnostic categoriza-
tion.
In desperation, forensic psychiatrists have turned to the legal profession for help.
They have proposed and vigorously advocated various legal changes the effect of
which would be to conceal diagnostic unreliability or to make the diagnosis less
accessible to attack. Probably the greatest favor that judges, lawyers, and legislators
can do for the profession of psychiatry is to implement its plans to eliminate the
"battle of the experts" and to render the psychiatrist's diagnosis unchallengeable.
The relentless attempts of the psychiatrists to bring these changes about and the
increasing tendency of the legal profession to yield to their entreaties need not
be detailed here, since these issues are the subject of a forthcoming paper by the
writer. For now, it need only be noted that psychiatrists have insisted that somehow,
sometime, the lawyers must find ways to extricate the profession of psychiatry from
a very embarrassing state of affairs.
It might be argued that the unreliability of psychiatric diagnoses and judgments
is flagrantly evident in the psychiatric literature and cannot be concealed. But the
availability of evidence has made no difference to those judges and lawyers who
are making momentous decisions and recommendations hospitable to psychiatry.
Furthermore, some judges are not disturbed by the disagreements of physicians.
One of these is Judge John Biggs, Jr. He is Chief Judge of the Third Judicial
Circuit of the United States. Judge Biggs has been very friendly to psychiatry. His
opinions reflect the kind of views whose adoption psychiatrists have been urging.
These opinions have been widely cited and hailed by psychiatrists. The American
Psychiatric Association bestowed the Isaac Ray Award upon Judge Biggs. This is
given annually to a member either of the legal or of the psychiatric profession who
has contributed notably to the improvement, of the relations between psychiatry and
the law. As part of the award, Judge Biggs received one thousand dollars. As
another part, he had the privilege of giving a series of lectures on forensic psychiatry
at a university of his choice. These lectures have been published in a book." 3
An examination of the notes in this book reveals that it contains almost no citations
112 Ackerman, Psychiatric DLsrders in Children-iagnosis and Etiology in Our Time, in PAUL
H. HOcH & JOSEPH ZUBIN (EUs.), CURRENT PROBLEMS IN PSYcHIATRIc DIAGNOSIS 221 (1953).
... JOHN BIGGS, JR., THE GUILTY MInD (1955).
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of psychiatric literature. In the rare instances when such citations do occur in the
book, they refer to the propagandistic literature the nature of which has been dis-
cussed more than once in this paper. Judge Biggs has said, "Let me make it clear
that I am not objecting to even skillful physicians differing in their diagnoses." He
further commented, "Heaven knows they differ less than lawyers and judges,' 1 4
thus overlooking the fundamental differences between medicine and law, the serious
implications of the disagreements of physicians, the distinction between scientific
questions and value judgments, the fact that the social judgments of psychiatrists
are being mistaken by themselves and others for medical judgments, and the
methodblogical and philosophical reasons why it is perfectly legitimate for judges
and lawyers to disagree but not permissible for psychiatrists to do so.
It has been seen that psychiatric diagnoses are grossly unreliable. But psychiatrists
do diagnose. In the courts, to repeat a point, life or death can depend upon their
diagnoses. It is important, therefore, to look into the nature of those diseases and
other mental infirmities which psychiatrists diagnose in offenders. Obviously, it
will not be possible to discuss all such diseases. Therefore, the two most important




Probably the mental condition most often discussed in connection with de-
linquency and crime is "psychopathic personality" or "psychopathy. '' liS One in-
vestigator has listed 202 terms used as equivalents of these,"' but even this list
does not exhaust the number. In 1952, the American Psychiatric Association adopted
the new term, "sociopathic personality," for this condition.ll" Since then, the old
term continues to be the more widely-used one. The old term and its derivative
forms will be used here for convenience.
""
4 Biggs, The Lawyer Looks at the Doctor, 28 DEL. STATE MED. J. 122, 125 (1956).
..
5 The words "psychopathic" and "psychopathy" used in the present context should not be con-
fused with one of their dictionary definitions-namely, a generic term meaning mental disorder.
"Psychopathic personality" or "psychopathy" is used by psychiatrists to designate a type of mental
disease.
Recently, Dr. Albert H. Arenowitz, a juvenile court psychiatrist, speaking before the Ross Club of the
University of Wisconsin, misinformed a large audience that the concept of psychopathic personality was no
longer used, having been discarded by psychiatrists many years ago. In the few months before and
after this disavowal of the concept, a large number of books and many dozens of articles devoted in whole
or in part to psychopathic personality were published. The concept has been and is now one of the most
important in psychiatry and the most important in forensic psychiatry. Under its newer name, "socio-
pathic personality," this is the diagnosis a psychiatrist applied to Charles Starkweather in the course of his
widely-publicized trial in Lincoln, Nebraska, in May x958, for one of the eleven murders he admittedly
committed.
... Cason, The Psychopath and the Psychopathic, 4 J. CRlM. PSYCHOPATH. 522 (1943).
... The change in terminology has not resulted in any other changes in the concept. Discussions on
"sociopathic personality" are identical to discussions on "psychopathic personality." Often, authors using
the new term explicitly state that they mean by sociopathic personality what was meant by the old
term psychopathic personality.
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Without exception, on every point regarding psychopathic personality, psychia-
trists present varying or contradictory views. There is danger that such a statement
will be mistaken for hyperbolic emphasis. Therefore, it should be explicitly made
clear that the statement is meant to be taken literally. Not all points can be
illustrated here, but a few will be presented, remembering that whenever one
authority is cited, dozens of others taking a like position on the point in question
could be cited.
Psychiatrists are in disagreement on whether they are in agreement or in dis-
agreement on the subject. One investigator questioned seventy-five authorities,
sixty-four of whom were psychiatrists, on how much agreement exists among
psychiatrists on the concept of sexual psychopathy. Forty-two replied that there is
no substantial agreement and twenty-four that there is." Campbell is surprised at
"how much conformity exists in the minds of practicing psychiatrists concerning
psychopathic personality";" 9 Wilson and Pescor, on the other hand, say that "prac-
tically every psychiatrist has his own idea of what constitutes a psychopathic per-
sonality. ,, 0 Cleckley, intending to show that great unanimity exists regarding
this concept, says: "If a psychiatrist, in speaking to another about a patient, uses the
term psychopath, there is seldom any misunderstanding as to the sort of patient in
question";' but Duval states: "... [A]ctually I am not sure whether we know
what we are talking about when we speak of the psychopath.... ,22 Thompson
attributes the great amount of agreement among psychiatrists on the concept of
psychopathy to the fact that it "is such a well-defined entity that its symptoms and
characteristics are as well known to the psychiatrist as the symptoms of measles are
known to the pediatrician";'3 but this is countered by Kennard's observation:
"Clinicians do not even agree, actually, as to whether such a category exists.'
' 4
Overholser and Richmond express the view that "there is no general agreement
among psychiatrists as to what type of personality should be designated psycho-
pathic,"' 2' only to be contradicted by Guttmacher and Weihofen, who say that while
opinion about psychopathy is not unanimous, "there is considerable agreement.'
28
Lowrey, referring to the diagnosis of psychopathic personality, thinks that "the
important point is that psychiatrists agree there is such a group of abnormal per-
sonalities . .. .,;2T while Stevenson, writing about the same concept, puts the issue
18 PAUL W. TAPPAN, THE HABITUAL SEX OFFENDER 57 (1950).
11 JOHN D. CAMPBELL, EVERYDAY PSYCHIATRY 67 (Ed ed. 1949).
...J. G. WILSoN & M. J. PESCOR, PROBLEMS IN PRISON PSYCHIATRY 134 (939).
... Cleckley, The Psychopath Viewed Practically, in ROBERT M. LINDNER & ROBERT V. SELIGER (EDs.),
HANDBOOK OF CoR crIoNAL PSYCHOLOGY 395 (1947).
... DANIEL BLAIN (ED.), STmS FORwARD IN MENT. HOSPITALS 178 (1953).
1.. GEORGE N. THOMPSON, THE PSYCHOPATHIC DELINQUENT AND CRIMINAL 39 (953).
... Kennard, in discussion of Hill, EEG in Episodic, Psychotic and Psychopathic Behaviour: A Classi-
fication of Data, 4 ELECTROENCEPL & CLIN. NEUROPHYS. 419, 440 (1952).
'213 WVINFRED OVERHOLSER & WINIFRED V. RICHMOND, HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 184 (947).
18 GUTrrIMACHER & WEiHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 88.
1LwsoN G. LowEBY, PSYCmATRY FOR SOCIAL WORKERS 260 (2d ed. 195o).
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as follows: "There is much disagreement as to the validity of this category as a
diagnosis." 2 '
Is psychopathic personality a clinical entity? There are contradictory views on
this question, varying from those who, after extensive study of the matter, hold
that it is "a very definite clinical entity"'2 to those who, after extensive study of the
matter, hold that "there is no such entity."'13 0 Is psychopathic personality a serious
condition? Every conceivable shade of opinion is espoused. Wertham is satisfied,
as are other clinicians, that psychopathy is a "mild kind of abnormality not gross
enough to be called a mental disease"'' or to be regarded as a "psychosis."' 82  But
Thorne is satisfied that it is just as malignant as a psychosis;"8 3 Carroll explicitly
states that it is a "mental disease"; 34 and Darling and Sanddal say it is a "psy-
chosis.""3 5
How frequently is psychopathic personality found among offenders? It depends
entirely on which psychiatrist is asked, because estimates of the proportion of crim-
inals who are psychopaths and the proportion of psychopaths who are criminals
vary from o to ioo per cent. One psychiatrist holds that the criminal is "rarely"
psychopathic.3'3  Another claims that criminals are "usually" psychopathic' 3 7  Two
others insist that all psychopathic personalities are pathological criminals. 188 Another
counters that many psychopaths are not criminals. 3  One goes so far as to reveal
that he has seen "as many psychopathic judges, lawyers, police officers, and psychia-
trists as psychopathic criminals."'40 A reception center of a state prison system has
reported that only 2.3 per cent of prisoners admitted in a twelve-year period were
diagnosed as psychopaths by psychiatrists. 4' Three psychiatrists speculate that
about five per cent of convicted prisoners may be psychopathic. 42 Two others found
fourteen per cent of prisoners psychopathic. 3 Another holds that one-fourth to one-
half of all criminals are psychopathic' 44  Three others are convinced that three-
12. GEORGE S. STE ENSON, MENTAL HEALTH PLANNING FOR SOCIAL ACTION 144 (s956).
12 HERVEY CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF SANITY 210 (3d ed. x955).
"" Abrahamsen, Study of zo2 Sex Offenders at Sing Sing, Fed. Prob., Sept. 1950, pp. 26, 27.
.
8 FRERic WERTHAm, THE SHOW OF VIOLENCE 85 (949).
.
2
. Id. at 128.
... Thorne, supra note 94, at 235.
... ROYAL COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, Op. cit. stepra note 59, at 551.
""Darling & Sanddal, A Psychopathologic Concept of Psychopathic Personality, 13 J. CLIN. & EXPER.
PSYCHOPATH. 175, 178 (1952).
... Hulbert, Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority in Relation to Delinquency, 30 J. CRIm. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 3, I3 (939).
187 C. S. BLUEMEL, THE TROUBLED MIND 491 (938).
128J. M. NIELSEN & GEORGE N. THOMFsON, THE ENGRAMMES OF PSYCHIATRY 190 (3947).
SLOWREY, op. cit. supra note r27, at 267.
1 B0 A aM MERSON, SPEAKING OF MAN 385 (1950).
"' Pennington, Psychopathic and Criminal Behavior, in L. A. PENNIN OTo & IRWIN A. BERG (Evs.),
INTRODUCTION TO CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 424 (2d ed. 1954).
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Research, 2 B IT. J. DELINQ. X17, 127 (1951).
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fourths of prisoners under twenty-one years of age are psychopaths 45 Another
testifies that ninety per cent or more of incarcerated delinquents are potential, if not
actual, psychopaths
46
What types of crimes do psychopaths commit? No one answer can be given,
seeing that different psychiatrists take entirely different positions. One has said that
psychopaths "are driven . . . to deeds of violence which are as uncontrollable as a
tidal wave."' 47  Two others, not even mentioning violence, have stated that the
antisocial behavior of psychopaths "consists of every form of petty misdemeanor." '14
Another has explained that a "common feature" of the psychopath is the commission
of serious crimes of violence. 49 This is contradicted by the opinion of another, who
has concluded that the crimes of psychopaths "generally... are not in the category of
major crimes."'"5 Two psychiatrists have asserted that "crimes of violence such as
assault, rape and murder . . . are typical acts of psychopathic criminals,"'' but this
is opposed by the view of another, who has said that the typical psychopath is not
likely to commit "major" crimes' 5 2 One psychiatrist, medically describing the
psychopath as an "incorrigible monster,"' 53 makes this alarming, and at the same
time comforting, observation: "We can thank heaven that the type is rare because the
offenses within the range of the genuine psychopath are without limits." "They
will," says he, without giving a shred of evidence, "commit profit murder for a sum
as low as twenty-five dollars.' 54  There is more reassurance in the observation of
another psychiatrist, who, while he presents no evidence either, holds that the crimes
of the psychopath are "usually ... relatively minor."' 5  In a widely-used textbook,
three psychiatrists, who are apparently disinclined to get embroiled in these dizzying
controversies, have taken refuge in the following sweeping position about the
psychopath's behavior: "The behavior of these patients may vary from amiable lying
to criminal activity."' 6
What causes psychopathic personality? No single answer would do justice to
the large array of factors implicated by different psychiatrists in the causation of this
malady. There is no disease like psychopathy in the whole realm of medicine. It
is the only disease known for which some practitioners blame conditions in the
home and some, conditions in the central nervous system. Birnbaum finds that
14 Haugen, Coen, & Dickel, supra note 47, at 85.
'
45
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psychopathy is "constitutional; that is innate and (probably) hereditary";"'7 Bender,
that it is the purest example of "psychogenic or environmentally determined be-
havior disorders .. .,"; Lichtenstein and Small, that in many cases, it is directly
attributable to endocrine dysfunction; 5 9 Greenacre, that it is due to poor parent-child
relations;'O' Nielsen and Thompson, that cerebral trauma is the commonest cause;..'
O'Conner, that deprivation of "blood-sugar" has been implicated; 0 2 and Palmer,
that "deprivation of Mother Love" is the basic factor.13  Two distinguished experts
on psychopathy caution that different factors can cause this disease in different
patients. They hold that in some cases, the predominating cause will be such factors
as poverty, a broken home, and so on; and in other cases, "disturbance of the pre-
frontal hypothalamic connections," brain injury, and the like." 4 Finally, with re-
freshing simplicity, one psychiatrist suggests, in effect, that psychopathic personality
results from the failure to train the child to behave himself.0
What do psychiatrists say about treatment of psychopaths? Everything, for
viewpoints on the treatment of this disease vary markedly from psychiatrist to
psychiatrist. Asked by the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment whether any
progress had been made toward curing psychopaths, one expert answered, "I am
afraid not."' 6 A different psychiatrist, answering the same question submitted by
the same Commission, said that the curability of the psychopath is "surprisingly
large.' 67  When it comes to specific treatments that have been proposed or tried,
there is rampant diversity. They run the gamut from attempts to incorporate the
subject into groups having athletic, cultural, political, or religious interests, 0 ' to
brain surgery. 69 One intriguing type of treatment has been reported in which "the
psychopathic delinquent is brought before an awesome panel of doctors who literally
say nothing beyond an initial expression of their desire to help the culprit once he is
honestly interested in helping himself." The hazards of this approach are tremen-
dous, judging from one observation that has been made:"... [T]he psychopath can
sit out the doctors easily enough."'70
Psychiatrists do not disagree only with each other. Some disagree with them-
selves. Often it is possible to find one and the same psychiatrist taking contradictory
'" Birnbaum, A Court Psychiatrist's View of Juvenile Delinquents, 261 ANNALS 55, 59 (1949).
15
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stands on the same question from publication to publication, on different pages of
the same publication, and on the same page of the same publication. For example,
Banay, a psychiatric consultant to the Federal Bureau of Prisons, has taken curious
positions on the psychopath. In a conference on criminal responsibility held in early
1957, he rejected the concept of psychopathic personality, saying: "I am very much in
disagreement with the diagnosis of psychopath. Psychopath means we don't know
what is wrong with him." '' Just about the time Banay was making this state-
ment, a book written by him was published. In this book, he describes in detail
a treatment for psychopaths:1'
Marked success in the treatment of some psychopaths has been obtained through a
combination of electrocoma and psychotherapy. The treatment requires hospitalization for
eight months to a year and it consists of a series of electrocoma treatments followed by
analytically oriented psychotherapy. This is followed by further ambulatory treatment
under therapeutic conditions. The procedure has been tested sufficiently to show that
many aggressive psychopaths can be guided to adequate social adjustment, over-all change
of temperamental trends and freedom from criminal inclinations.
Banay is prescribing drastic and lengthy "therapy" for a diagnostic category he
rejects.
Guttmacher took the position in 1951 that "the diagnosis of a psychopathic per-
sonality is practically meaningless." He elaborated on the point by urging that the
term be discarded or restricted to a type of case described by Cleckley.1'7 But in
the 1951 annual report of the court clinic of which Guttmacher is Chief Medical
Officer, it is recorded that forty-eight cases were diagnosed as psychopaths of a type
other than that described by CleckleyY74 Furthermore, in his memorandum to
the American Law Institute, Guttmacher raises no question whatever about the
validity of the diagnosis of psychopathic personality, and, in fact, he favors the
institutionalization of psychopaths for an indeterminate period 75  Guttmacher's
clinic is attaching to offenders a diagnosis which he admits is practically meaning-
less. And, in one place, he is recommending possible lifelong custody for offenders
who are diagnosed as having a disease which, in another place, he says is practically
meaningless.
McCarthy and Corrin state that the psychopath "is within normal limits in-
tellectually . . ."; however, on another page of the same book, they state that "the
psychopath is inferior ...intellectually. . . ." Again, these authors hold that the
condition of the psychopath is "clear-cut and uniform in its symptomatology . ..";
but in the very next paragraph, on the same page, still referring to the same diag-
171 Mental Disorder and Criminal Responsibility: A Symposium, supra note 73, at 82.
172 RALPH S. BANAY, WE CALL THEM CRIMINALS 170 (1957).
'"Guttmacher, Diagnosis and Etiology of Psychopathic Personalities as Perceived in Our Time,
in PAUL H. HOCH & JOSEPH ZUBIN (EDs.), CURRENT PROBLEMS IN PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS 155 (1953).
.. MEDICAL OFFICER OF THE SUPREME BENCH OF BALTIMORE CITY, REPORT 8 (i95i).
171 Guttmacher, Principal Difficulties with the Present Criteria of Responsibility and Possible Alterna-
lives, MODEL PENAL CODE app. B, at 177 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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nosis, they assert that "there is no symptom, syndrome or behavior dynamics upon
which one may base a diagnosis."17
How is psychopathic personality diagnosed? Numerous psychiatrists have ex-
plicitly and implicitly admitted that to diagnose this disease they do not need to
examine the subject's body-which, incidentally, is universally acknowledged to be
the only legitimate object of investigation in every other branch of medicine. To
diagnose psychopathic personality, the psychiatrist needs to examine only the subject's
FBI record. Numerous psychiatrists have explicitly stated that they can make this
diagnosis if they have access to only the social history of the "patient," particularly
a record of his crimes. One example is Strecker's statement that "since there are no
strong and clear-cut diagnostic criteria, the diagnosis [psychopathic personality] has
to be made retrospectively on the basis of a long history of psychopathic behavior."'
77
An even more pointed example is provided by the following quotation: "For di-
agnosis of these states [psychopathic personality] an adequate social history is im-
perative. The psychopath is not apt to reveal his difficulties with the environment
voluntarily.' 178 One of the newest textbooks on psychiatry teaches that to place a
subject in the category of psychopathic personality, "the antisocial behavior of the
patient should be the principal manifestation of the disorder."' 70 Another textbook
advises that "no diagnosis of psychopathic personality should be made in the ab-
sence of punishable or censurable acts episodically carried out."'8'  Davidson, al-
though discussing psychopathy in witnesses rather than in offenders, makes the
following statement, which obviously would apply in any context:181
The diagnosis of psychopathy is not made by examination but by a review of the life
history. Examination shows nothing. The life history shows a record of trouble, of shift-
lessness, of nomadism, of dishonesty, of nonconformity, of mischief or of some similar
trait. When this is the history in a witness of good intelligence and obvious sanity, one
has the right to suspect psychopathy.
It is clear what is being admitted in all these excerpts: To be able to diagnose
psychopathy, the psychiatrist needs to have evidence that the subject shows a history
of psychopathy. A history of psychopathy consists of the subject's record of crime or
of other social maladjustment. Given this history, the psychiatrist can diagnose
psychopathy. Obviously, a psychiatrist is not needed to diagnose psychopathy. The
policeman or the file clerk keeping criminal records could fully measure up to the
task.
It should be very clear by now-to all except those who are immovably deter-
mined not to allow reason to interfere with their worshipful admiration of psychiatry
"71 DANIEL J. McCARTHY & KENNETH M. CORRIN, MEDICAL TREATMENT OF MENTAL DISEASES 402, 403,
405 (1955).
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PSYCHIATRY 251, 253 (1941).
" EWALT, STRECKER, & EBAUGH, Op. cit. supra note x56, at 258.
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(an all too common foible)-that there is no such thing as a medical (psychiatric)
"disease" called psychopathic or sociopathic personality. This disease, like so many
other in psychiatry, is a figment of the fertile imagination of psychiatrists. Psycho-
pathy is nothing but a synonym for crime and delinquency. Whether or not a
person is said to have this disease depends, like so many other diseases in psychiatry,
more on what is going on in the head of the psychiatrist than what is going on in the
head of the "patient." Just such an observation comes from an unexpected source.
Karpman has noted:1
8 2
... [I]t is perhaps more likely that in studying xoo consecutive cases diagnosed psycho-
pathic personality, what we get is not an understanding of the patient, but a study of the
mind of a psychiatrist, that is what he means when he makes a diagnosis of psychopathic
personality. It is then discovered that the average psychiatrist calls an individual psycho-
pathic if in some way the individual has gone against the social grain.
Despite all the evidence available, only an insignificant proportion of which has
been presented here, despite the disconcerting observation by a psychiatrist that "at
present there is no objective proof that they [psychopaths] are ill rather than
wicked . . .";"' despite the fact that Cleckley, one of the foremost proponents of the
concept of psychopathy, grants that its "psychopathology ... is debatable and scarcely
to be proved in courts,"'18 4 despite the angry accusation by Kinberg, the interna-
tionally known forensic psychiatrist, that in their approach to psychopathic per-
sonality, psychiatrists are practicing something that looks very much more like
quackery than medicine,"' the courts are admitting testimony about this diagnosis
and are allowing the adjudication and disposition of cases to be influenced by it.
This concept and psychiatric testimony about it should not be allowed in court,
no disposition of cases should be based on it, and it should not be considered in
any serious way in deliberations about defendants. No laws incorporating this
concept, in any of its forms or under any of its names, should be passed. Legisla-
tion of this type already passed should be repealed. And, it goes without saying,
correctional decisions should not be based on such a diagnosis.
In the meantime, society, especially the legal profession, would be wise to keep
a very close watch over those courts that allow psychiatrists to testify about this
concept. A court that would allow this is just as likely to allow testimony on witch-
craft. More heed should be given to those psychiatrists who are capable of at least
some sensible judgment about this matter, as illustrated in the following reflection:
"Perhaps our psychopathic personality is the heretic or witch in modern guise.' 186
182Karpman, Psychopathy as a Form of Social Parasitism-A Comparative Biological Study, xo J.
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And no special perspicacity is needed to see a statement like the following, made
by a psychiatrist in the course of an assault on the law for its reluctance to show
greater hospitality to psychiatry, for the fraudulent pretense that it is: ".... [J]udges




Another mental condition frequently said to be associated with delinquent and
criminal behavior is psychoneurosis, or, to use the equivalent and shorter term,
neurosis. It is impossible to state briefly the psychiatric position on the relationship
between neurosis and delinquency or crime for two reasons: first, there is endless
disagreement among psychiatrists on every facet of the concept of neurosis; and
second, there are as many views on its relation to delinquency and crime as there
are psychiatrists.
A psychiatrist who is an outstanding expert on neurosis recently made the
following observation:...
Probably nothing has been less conclusively defined than the nature of the neurotic
process; and about nothing is there more confusion between laymen and behavioral
scientists, among the several varieties of behavioral scientists, and even within the close
fraternity of psychiatrists and the even closer fraternity of analysts.
This has been echoed by numerous experts. But it is not only the "nature of the
neurotic process" that is in doubt. Usually, many more aspects of the concept are
brought into question, as can be seen from the following typical conclusion: "Psychi-
atric diagnosis of neurosis is not yet standardized; there is variation in the nomen-
clature and the meaning ascribed to the diagnostic categories. There is widely differ-
ing emphasis on phenomenology, and etiology.' ' 9
Despite this reported state of uncertainty and the apparent divergence in view-
points, neurosis is usually denominated a "disease." One psychiatrist, for example,
counsels that neurosis "is always to be looked upon as a sickness (disease). .. .",0
Another has pointed out that "mental disease is a term which includes psychosis and
neurosis."' 91 No psychiatrist who takes the position that neurosis is a disease, how-
ever, has ever specified the organ in which it occurs, the type of lesion involved, or
the kind of trauma, chemical imbalance, bacteria, virus, or other agent thought to
be instrumental in its causation. If neurosis is a disease and if psychiatrists proceed
in the manner of other medical practitioners-a point on which they unblushingly
111 Glover, Outline of the investigation and Treatment of Delinquency in Great Britain: '912-1948:
With Special Reference to Psychoanalytical and Other Psychological Methods, in EissLER, op. cit. supra
note 26, at 435.
188 Kubie, Social Forces and the Neurotic Process, in ALEXANDER H. LEIGrroN, JOHN A. CLAUSEN&
ROBERT N. WILSON (Ens.), EXPLORATIONS IN SOCIAL PSYCMATRY 80 (1957).
.8 Freedman & Hollingshead, Neurosis and Social Class, x 3 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 769, 771 (1957).
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insist-then it is incumbent upon them to show diseased tissue in neurosis. On the
other hand, there are some psychiatrists who say that neurosis is not a disease. Some
say that neurosis is the inability to get along -with people. 92  But that is not disease;
nor is it a medical problem. Another view.has it that neurosis, and psychosis, too,
for that matter, are not diseases located in the individual, but are problems involving
group organization.'93 But this is a concern of sociology, not medicine.
If neurosis is a disease, then it, like psychopathic personality, is one of the
strangest kind of disease imaginable. This is certainly the impression one gets from
a very recently-issued report of a comprehensive and elaborate research on the rela-
tionship between mental illness and social class, undertaken by a team of psychi-
trists, sociologists, psychologists, and others. Based on their study of the processes out
of which psychiatric diagnoses emerge, these investigators were forced to the
following observation :..
We take the position that a neurosis is a state of mind not only of the'sufferer, but
also of the therapist, and it appears likewise to be connected to the class positions of
the therapist and the patient. A diagnosis arises from a number of conditioning factors:
the experiences of the patient, the training and techniques of the doctor, as well as the
social values of the community. Stated otherwise, a diagnosis of neurosis is a resultant
of a social interactional process which involves the patient, the doctor, and the patient's
position in the status structure of the community.
Apparently, then, the diagnosis of neurosis in a "patient" is dependent on the
intricate convergence of a number of factors-.the mental condition of the psychia-
trist, a process of social -interaction, the relative social class positions of the psychia-
trist and the patient, and. the social values prevailing in the community. These re-
searchers also learned that -the concept of neurosis can have reference to either a
theological dogma, a philosophical premise, or a bodily disturbance:. "The sinfulness
of the Bible, the Angst of the Kierkegaardians, the 'nausea' of the existentialists,
and the 'stress' of the internists are all syndromes which ,may be and have been
subsumed under the term neurosiS'by some'experts."'95 It is clear that one cannot
be too -sure whether an attack of neurosis is a problem calling for the ministrations
of the physician or of the preacher.
It should be reiterated that the problems associated with the diagnosis: of neurosis,
as is true of other psychiatric -diagnoses and concepts, are not matters of mere aca-
demic import. The psychiatrist's 'Views on neurosis and all .the' inferences he draws
from them can affect offenders in'a multitude /*f ways. it is obvious that'-if a
psychiatrist considers psychopathic personality to be a mental disease but does not
so consider neurosis, or vice versa, 'and if a crihiinal act restilting frori a mental
"~'Redlich, The Concept of Health in Pyschiatry, in LEIGHTON, CLAUSEN, AND WILSON, op. cit. supra
note I88, at 144.
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disease is not punishable, the differential diagnosis of these two conditions becomes
a critical matter. Therefore, it is important to take a look at the notions of the
psychiatrists on the. relationship between neurosis and criminal or delinquent be-
havior, which, as has been stated and as can be guessed by now, are the subject of
abounding controversies.
One psychiatrist includes "the child's delinquent behavior-all delinquent be-
havior-within the framework of the neuroses." He contends that "the delinquent
act is but a special type-a syndrome . . . within the group designated 'the
neuroses."'10 Yet, one psychiatrist found that only twenty-four, or .6 of one per
cent, out of 4,ooo delinquents examined by him gave evidence of a psychoneurotic
reaction.' On the other hand, in the well-known study by the Gluecks, it was
-found that 24.6 per cent of 5oo delinquents were neurotic-a proportion over forty
times larger than that found in the report just cited."' It is the observation of a
psychiatrist that "most" children with a long history of delinquency referred to child
guidance clinics are neurotic.' Yet, psychiatrists who examined the more serious
delinquents referred to them by a juvenile court during a one-year period diagnosed
only 44 per cent as neurotic.200 One psychiatrist has expressed the opinion that
psychoneurosis "constitutes quite a considerable group of the delinquents. '21 This
is contradicted by another, however, who says that it is "rare" for neurosis to be a
decisive factor in delinquency
2
Into the midst of these ongoing debates and these diligent efforts to settle on the
incidence of neurosis among delinquents, one psychiatrist recently interjected what
is not a new, but is, nonetheless, a most disconcerting, observation, and one which
will be discussed presently. He announced that there is an antithetical relation be-
tween psychoneurosis and delinquencyl- 203thereby embarrassing all those practi-
tioners who have given sworn testimony before any number of boards, committees,
and commissions that neurosis is a cause of delinquency and who, through the
years, have been confidently making known publicly the varying proportions of de-
linquents in whom they have found neurosis. The issue is further complicated by
those psychiatrists who find delinquents to be less neurotic, or less often neurotic,
than nondelinquents. Jenkins, as do others, comes to this conclusion. He first dis-
misses the theory that neurosis can account for all or a major fraction of delinquency
as one that "neither rings true nor makes sense." He then reasons that the delin-
"' Gardner, The Community and the Aggressive Child: The Expression of the Aggressive-Destrutieve
impulses in Juvenile-Delinquent Acts, 33 MENTAL HYGIENE 537, 541 (1949).
' East, cited by Gillespie, Psychoneurosis and Criminal Behaviour, in RADZINOWIcZ & TURNER, op.
cit. supra note 42, at 72.
" SHELDON & ELEANOR T. GLUECK, UNRAVELING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 239-40 (1950).
"'9 Lippman, Difficulties Encountered in the Psychiatric Treatment of Chronic luvenile Delinquents,
in EissLFR, op. cit. supra note 26, at 157.
"
0 JUwVENILE COURT OF CUY oGA COUNTY (CLEVELAND) ANN. REP. table x, at 38 (1957).
"0' Rees, Mental Variations and Criminal Behaviour, in RtAziNOwIcz & TURNER, op. cit. supra note
42, at 6.
20' Chess, Juvenile Delinquency: Whose Problem?, Fed. Prob., June 1955, pp. 29, 30.
203Glover, Psycho-Analysis and Criminology: A Political Survey, 37 INTL J. PSYCHo-ANAL. 311, 314
(1956).
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quent is inclined to be less neurotic than the nondelinquent. And he pushes the
point even further by describing the delinquent as one who is less prone to manifest
neurotic tendencies than are people in general2 04 In the research by the Gluecks,
in which a comparison is made between nondelinquents and delinquents, a sig-
nificantly higher proportion of neurotics was found among the former than among
the latter.
205
But suppose, for purposes of argument, it is granted that a major fraction (or
even all) offenders are neurotic. This would not distinguish them from various
specified groups in the population, from a large majority of human beings, or even
from all the inhabitants of this planet, if the judgment of certain psychiatrists can
be trusted. Take, for example, the research on the relationship between mental
illness and social class already referred to. One of its findings is that a considerable
proportion of the neurotics found in the upper social classes comprised psychiatrists,
psychologists, nurses, social workers, artists, other professional workers, and persons
in the communication business206 In another research, it was discovered that college
students are as frequently neurotic as are prison inmates.207 In a survey of the inci-
dence of mental disorders among a random sample of the residents of a community
of three thousand people, it was found that fifty-seven per cent were neurotic.208 One
psychiatrist has claimed, "To understand the neuroses is to understand the average
person .... ,"209 Another has insisted that few residents of this continent can be called
"nonneurotic."2 0 Finally, a psychiatrist has gone on record as concurring with another
expert whom he paraphrases as saying that "all persons, in all cultures, are victims-
whether to a greater or to a lesser extent-of a widely prevalent social neurosis the
existence of which is now evident beyond any question ,"l thus still leaving
unsettled the question whether neurosis is a social or a medical phenomenon.
When it comes to the matter of similarities and differences between neurosis and
psychopathic personality, the chaos is complete. Sometimes, one encounters the view
that these diseases are worlds apart, and sometimes, that they are one and the
same. Thompson holds to the former view, saying that the dissimilarity between
the two diseases is "essentially complete." '212 In another source, he joins a colleague
in the following elaboration: "The psychopath and psychoneurotic seem to be at
opposite extremes with regard to personality function." ' And they emphasize that
when it comes to the traits characterizing the two diagnostic categories, "the in-
2. Jenkins, Adaptive and Maladaptive Delinquency, ii NERvous CHILD 9, 11 (955).
2.. SHELDON & ELEANOR T. GLUECK, Op. cit. supra note z98.
o HOLLNOSHEAD & REDLICH, op. cit. supra note 194, at 337.
2
'T Levy ct al., The Outstanding Personality Factors Among the Population of a State Penitentiary: A
Preliminary Report, 13 J. CLIN. & EXPER. PSYCHOPATH. 117, 121 (1952).
20'Leighton, The Distribution of Psychiatric Symptoms in a Small Town, 112 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY
76, 722 (1956).
' LEON J. SAUL, EMOTIONAL MATURITY vii (1947)-
210 JAMES CLARK MOLONEY, TIE BATTLE FOR MENTAL HEALTH 8 (1952).
2 "'Thornton, Book Review, 41 J. CRiu. L., C. & P.S. 807 (951).
.12 THOMPSON, Op. cit. supra note 123, at 50.
212 NIELSEN & THOMPSON, op. cit. supra note 138, at x85.
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compatibility seems absolute." ' 4 But this orientation is negated by Federn, who, in
speaking of criminal psychopathy, holds that this condition is "usually combined
with neurotic symptoms and neurotic character traits." 1" And Schilder says he in-
clines to the view that the two terms, "psychopathic" and "neurotic," are "equiva-
lent."21  Guttmacher goes even further toward obliterating the distinction when
he writes that criminal psychopaths "suffer from a deep-seated neurosis. 217
The opinions just recounted cast serious doubt, to say the least, on the separa-
bility of psychopathic personality and neurosis as two distinct and vastly dissimilar
disease entities. Any lingering doubt is completely removed by still another theory
that has numerous adherents among psychiatrists. This theory makes of psycho-
pathic personality nothing more than a manifestation of neurosis. It is explained by
those who identify with this school of thought that psychopathic personality is
neurosis expressed in antisocial behavior.21s Persons are diagnosed as psychopathic,
according to this scheme, "when their antisocial behavior is the principle [sic] man-
ifestation of their neurosis."2 9  But these definitions are precisely the ones psychi-
atrists give of neurotic delinquency itself, without reference in any manner or form
to psychopathic personality. A typical example is the following: "The essential
feature of neurotic delinquency is that it represents behavior directed against society
to express a neurotic conflict." 220
Now, it so happens that such assertions-that psychopathic personality is neurosis
manifested in antisocial behavior, that neurotic delinquency is the solution of neurotic
conflicts through the commission of aggressive acts, and the simple assertion that
neurotics do commit delinquency and crime-are in complete conflict with another
postulate, referred to earlier in passing, often made by psychiatrists. This postulate
affirms that it is inherent in the very nature of neurosis that those afflicted with it do
not commit offenses. Further, it is contended that the psychopath "acts out" (to use
the psychiatric jargon for the commission of aggressive, criminal, or destructive
deeds), in contradistinction to the neurotic who does not act out, but rather suffers
inwardly or escapes into fantasy. According to Alexander, for example, the very
criterion that distinguishes psychopaths from neurotics is that "they [psychopaths]
'act out' their neurotic impulses, in contrast to psychoneurotics whose most important
activity is in their fantasy."2 1 Sometimes the same point is made in a different way.
Abrahamsen, to choose only one example from among many, claims that the offender
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is not open to a neurotic because he is "too inhibited."22 - However, Banay declares
that just the opposite is true-namely, that one of the means by which offenders get
release from neurotic conflicts is to commit delinquencies rather than to remain
inhibited.223 And others go even further and say that a neurotic offender commits
crimes "precisely because he is over-inhibited .... "224
Understandably, two psychiatrists recently sought to evade this whole horrendous
muddle. Brancale and Heyn reported that those offenders whom they now diagnose
as neurotic correspond to those formerly diagnosed as psychopathic 2 5 And Karp-
man, who is Chief Psychotherapist at St. Elizabeth's Hospital, apparently refusing to
let this diagnostic fuss stay his therapeutic hand, has solved the problem at least for
one category of offenders: "I have developed a rather simple method of dealing with
sexual offenders; I merely change the diagnosis from one of psychopathy to one of
neurosis and then proceed to treat as any neurosis.
2 26
The diagnosis of neurosis obviously is no more reliable or valid than is the
diagnosis of psychopathic personality. This and the other criticisms that can be
made of the diagnosis of neurosis need not be rehearsed in detail. They are pre-
cisely the same as have already been made respecting psychopathic personality.
VI
CONCLUSIONS
Psychiatric testimony should not be admissible in court. The courts have tradi-
tionally followed the principle that expert testimony and evidence that purport to be
scientific will not be admissible unless their reliability and validity have been amply
tested and unless substantial agreement among the appropriate experts has been
demonstrated. When it comes to psychiatric testimony, the courts are acting in
heedless disregard and flagrant violation of this eminently sound principle. It
should be unmistakably clear on the basis of the evidence adduced here-only a
tiny part of the available evidence-that psychiatrists have not attained the level of
competence and scientific reliability and validity necessary to make their testimony
eligible for serious consideration by the courts. Neither should it be looked upon
as an objective and sound basis for coercive decisions, judicial or correctional. The
courts should not allow psychiatric testimony to be heard, irrespective of whether the
psychiatrists are partisan or court-appointed, attached to a court clinic or to a hospital.
Furthermore, the courts and correctional agencies should not persist in giving
legal and official support and sanction to the almost universal fallacy of considering
psychiatrists to be experts on human behavior, motivation, personality, interpersonal
2.3Abrahamsen, Family Tension, Basic Cause of Criminal Behavior, 40 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
330, 336 (1949).
"I RALPH S. BANAY, YoUrH IN DESPAIR 141 (1948).
22' ALBERT ELLIS & RALPH BEANCALE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX OFFENDERS 39 (1956). [Italics in
original.]
22 Brancale & Heyn, Detection, Classification, and Treatment of the Youthful Offender, Fed. Prob.,
March 1957, pp. 33, 36.
'" BENIAMIN KARPMAN, THE SEXUAL OFFENDER AND HiS OFFENSES 574 (954).
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relations, problems of social organization, emotional reactions, crime and delinquency,
other social problems, and similar nonmedical topics. It is astounding that judges
and correctional officials continue to view psychiatrists as experts on human behavior
when there is considerable experimental and other research which shows laymen to
be superior to psychiatrists and associated personnel in the judgment of peoples'
motives, emotions, abilities, personality traits, and action tendencies2 7
It is certainly puzzling that the courts insist on admitting psychiatric testimony in
spite of the fact that some psychiatrists have repeatedly given candid and pointed
warnings against the dogmatism, aggressiveness, dubious tactics, and irresponsibility
of some of their colleagues, particularly those who have succeeded in overselling
psychiatry to the legal profession and to the general public. Some of the more cautious
practitioners know full well that psychiatry does not have knowledge that would
be helpful in the administration of justice. One of these, whose statement to this
effect has already been cited,228 makes the following rejoinder to the claim of some
psychiatrists that their success in bringing about changes in the laws of criminal
responsibility is due to the increasing knowledge of human behavior accumulated
during the past fifty years: "But is this why they have succeeded? I think not.
They have succeeded rather because they now possess more social power than they
had in the past.""°
:'Taft, The .4bility to Judge People, 52 PSYCHOLOGICAL BuLL. i (i955).
25 See supra note 15.
229 Szasz, supra note 15, at 314.
